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Abstract
This paper describes a new model on the evolution and induction of compositional structures
in the language of a population of (simulated) robotic agents. The model is based on recent work
in language evolution modelling, including the iterated learning model, the language game model
and the Talking Heads experiment. It further adopts techniques recently developed in the field of
grammar induction. The paper reports on a number of different experiments done with this new model
and shows certain conditions under which compositional structures can emerge. The paper confirms
previous findings that a transmission bottleneck serves as a pressure mechanism for the emergence
of compositionality, and that a communication strategy for guessing the references of utterances aids
in the development of qualitatively ‘good’ languages. In addition, the results show that the emerging
languages reflect the structure of the world to a large extent and that the development of a semantics,
together with a competitive selection mechanism, produces a faster emergence of compositionality
than a predefined semantics without such a selection mechanism.
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1. Introduction
One recent trend in models of language learning is the emergence of an increasing
number of models simulating certain aspects of the origins and evolution of language, see
[9,11,25,45] for overviews. This paper presents a new model to study the emergence and
dynamics of compositional structures in languages whose semantics are connected with
a simulated world. Although this world is far from realistic, it can be—and has been—
implemented physically using real robots [49].
The ability to form compositional structures—as part of syntax—is one of the key as-
pects of human language. Here is a definition of compositionality that was taken from a
web-site of a recent series of conferences on compositionality:2 “Compositionality is a
key feature of structured representational systems, be they linguistic, mental or neuronal.
A system of representations is compositional just in case the semantic values of complex
representations are determined by the semantic values of their parts.” For instance, the sen-
tence “give me the book” can be described semantically as give(me,thebook), where
the word “give” maps onto the action give, “me” onto the person me and “the book” onto
the object thebook. In contrast, holistic expressions have no structural relations between
parts of the expressions and parts of their meanings. In “kicked the bucket” when used to
mean died, for instance, no part of the expression has a relation to any part of the meaning
died (apart from the aspect of tense).3
One of the frequently asked questions in studies on language origins and evolution
is: how could compositional structures in human languages have emerged? One line of
research assumes that compositional structures emerged from exploiting (e.g. random) reg-
ularities found in protolanguages based on holophrases [67], a line of research that has
been adopted by many computational modellers, most notably [6,20,23]. In these studies,
it was shown that compositional structures in language can emerge when the learning ex-
amples do not cover the entire language (i.e., there was a bottleneck on the transmission of
language [20]), provided the learners have a predefined mechanism for acquiring composi-
tional structures. Other researchers have assumed that the ability to use syntax has evolved
as a biological adaptation [34], as modelled in, e.g., [8]. Yet other modellers have assumed
that compositional structures can emerge based on competition between exemplars [2] and
self-organisation in a production system [46]. Note that in all computer models developed
so far, learning mechanisms have been implemented that can acquire compositional struc-
tures. Hence, all studies use the assumption that a specialised learning mechanism has
evolved prior to the ‘emergence’ of compositional languages, and therefore investigate the
2 See http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/thphil/compositionality/ and http://www.cognition.ens.fr/
nac2004/.
3 Note that these examples are extreme and “easy” examples of compositionality. There are many other inter-
esting aspects of compositionality that are not covered by these examples. The given examples, however, suffice
for the purpose of this paper.
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too, and it is left for future research to investigate how such learning mechanisms could
have evolved.
Early computational studies on the origins and evolution of language have focused on
the formation of lexicons in systems with predefined meanings [19,30,33,43,65]. These
were followed by experiments on lexicon formation in systems connected with the real
world [10,38,47,49,50,55,57]. Meanwhile research on the emergence of syntactic struc-
tures, such as compositionality, also gained popularity. Usually these models have in-
corporated a predefined semantics [2,6,8,23]—or even no semantics at all [18,69]. The
researchers of these ‘ungrounded’ studies have justified their design choice by saying
that they only look at how syntactic structures can emerge and that this choice allows
them to concentrate on that particular aspect. In a way they are right, because it will have
helped them to focus on the emergence of syntax and their results are definitely insightful.
However, it seems realistic to assume that the semantics of languages have arisen from a
co-development of language and meaning in an embodied interaction of individuals with
the real world, see, e.g., [16,27,66]. Omitting such interactions could have important con-
sequences on the emergence of language in these individuals and hence in the population
as a whole.
The world in which we have used and developed language is already highly struc-
tured. Apples, for instance, all have roughly the same shape, but some can have differ-
ent colours. So, a red apple can be categorised based on its shape and colour as ob-
ject(shape(round),colour(red)). In a way, one could say that parts of the
object’s regular properties map directly on parts of the semantic description of the object.
By exploiting these regularities, e.g., based on statistical correlations, it appears plausible
that such structures have been utilised in natural languages. This idea is elaborated upon in
the current study in which it is assumed that syntactic structures co-evolve with semantic
structures. More formally, the following twofold hypothesis is proposed:
(1) The emergence of compositional linguistic structures is based on exploiting regular-
ities in (possibly random and holistic) expressions, cf. [67], though constrained by
semantic structures.
(2) The emergence of combinatorial semantic structures is based on exploiting regularities
found in the (interaction with the) natural world, though constrained by compositional
linguistic structures.
This hypothesis is investigated using a simulated multiple robot model.
Up to now, only a few studies have used (simulated) robots as a research platform to
investigate the emergence of compositional (and other grammatical) structures in language
[10,31,32,46,58]. The current work is an extension of the work presented in [58], which is
based on the Talking Heads experiment [49] and implements the language game model [43]
in combination with the iterated learning model [6,23]. The model further incorporates ma-
chine learning techniques on grammar induction adapted from [14,54]. In the experiments
the effect is investigated of evolving compositional languages following the iterated learn-
ing model, but with semantic development in connection to the simulated Talking Heads
world. In particular, the effect on the language dynamic and its stability of using different
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is studied.
The next section presents the simulation platform, the language game model and the
iterated learning model. Section 3 then explains the grammar inducer used to evolve
compositional structures. Experimental results are presented in Section 4 and these are
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Talking Heads
2.1. Modelling language evolution
Before explaining the model, some things need to be said concerning the modelling of
language evolution. Generally, the scientific aim of evolutionary linguistics is to study how
modern languages have evolved from a stage prior to language. Traditionally, this field
is studied by linguists, biologists, anthropologists, psychologists and primatologists. With
the rise of the computer and advancements in Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life,
computational modelling became another methodology for studying language evolution.
Models of language emergence and evolution typically involve a simulation using a multi-
agent system of which the individuals are able to communicate, perceive their world and
learn (often using standard machine learning techniques). They are typically situated in a
world, which may be highly abstract (e.g., in studies where the meanings are predefined) or
more realistic (e.g., in robotic models such as the one presented here). Modelling language
evolution turns out to be very useful, because it “provides a complementary methodology
that can help researchers to develop detailed and precise hypotheses on language origins
and evolution and to test these hypotheses in the virtual experimental laboratory of the
simulation” [11, p. 5].
The modelling studies can roughly be divided in three parts: (1) origins, (2) emer-
gence and (3) evolution. The origins question investigates how and why humans (and
other species) came to use communication, and how the language processing, creation and
acquisition mechanisms have evolved. The emergence question assumes communication,
processing, creation and acquisition mechanisms to be present and investigates how, given
these mechanisms, languages or aspects thereof come about. Finally, given a language
and the mechanisms mentioned, the evolution question investigates how the language then
evolves (or changes) over time. The current study ignores the origins question and focuses
on the emergence and evolution of language (or compositionality in particular).
Although the field investigates the evolution of human languages, using computer sim-
ulations means that the models are (often very crude) simplifications of human languages.
Typically, the models focus on one aspect of language (e.g., the emergence of composi-
tionality) and even then may abstract away from the natural human case. For instance, in
the current model
• the language that emerges is not used for any other function than to describe objects;
the individuals in the model do not use the communication to solve any other task than
to learn from each other;
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joint attention or providing corrective feedback, are extremely simplified;
• no effort is being made to provide the agents with a realistic phonological system:
words are invented as random strings of letters taken from a subset of the English
alphabet and hence appear gibberish to humans;
• the agents evolve their language in an abstract environment (based on a real physical
experiment) where they communicate about colours and shapes;
• the way agents perceive colours is far from realistic with respect to humans. Instead
of perceiving colours in a realistic manner (e.g., through the widely accepted CIE
L*a*b* colour space), the agents perceive the colours on the computer based RGB-
colour space. So, although colours appear prominently in this paper, the aim is not
to investigate the evolution of colour terms in human language (see [47] for a related
study on the emergence and evolution of human-like colour terms).
The reasons behind making such choices are that they allow straightforward implemen-
tation, while making a qualitative study on the specific research question, which in this case
is: Given some means for communication, perception and learning, how can compositional
structures in language emerge and evolve stably?
As mentioned, the current model is based on the Talking Heads experiment [3,49],
which originally consisted of a set of agents that could embody themselves in a pan-tilt
camera (thus becoming a physical robot) with which they could look at a scene displayed
at a white board. The scene typically contained coloured objects of a certain shape about
which the population tried to evolve a lexicon. The experiment was connected to the Inter-
net, which allowed human users to interact with the system by, e.g., adding and removing
agents to the population.
The current model is based on a simulation of this Talking Heads experiment and is part
of the THSim toolkit [59]. This toolkit, including its source code, is freely downloadable
from the Internet4 and allows users to investigate many aspects of lexicon formation and
to repeat the experiments described in this paper. THSim implements different versions of
language games and the iterated learning model.
2.2. The language game
In short, the model implements a situation in which the population of one generation
transmits their language to the next generation by engaging in language games [43]. The
language game (Fig. 1) is played by two agents: the speaker, which is typically an agent
from the older generation, and the hearer, which is typically an agent from the new gen-
eration. In the language game, both agents perceive (p) a context C containing a given
number of objects. For each object, the agents extract features (f) that describe the ob-
jects’ properties. The speaker selects one object as the topic (or target) and may inform the
hearer non-verbally which object is the topic. This is similar to pointing. If the hearer is
not informed, it considers all objects in the context as a potential topic.
4 http://www.ling.ed.ac.uk/˜paulv/thsim.html.
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language game between two agents: a speaker/teacher and a hearer/learner. See the text for details.
Both agents—individually—form a category (or meaning m) that distinguishes the topic
(or each potential topic) from the rest of the context. If no such category can be found, a
new one may be constructed and added to the agents’ private ontologies O. The categori-
sation is modelled using the discrimination game model [44], explained in Section 2.5.
The speaker then tries to encode the topic’s category into an expression (e), which
the hearer then tries to decode. If there is more than one way to encode or decode an
expression, the agent selects the way that has the highest score, based on a number of
weights that indicate the effectiveness of grammatical entries and their semantic properties.
These weights are adapted according to the effectiveness of each game. If there is no way
to encode or decode an expression, the agents construct new knowledge by inventing new
rules or inducing rules from heard expressions. This new knowledge is then added to the
agents’ private grammars G.
Two different types of language games are implemented for the current study: observa-
tional games and guessing games.5
Observational game: The speaker informs the hearer which object is the topic, thus estab-
lishing joint attention prior to the verbal communication. How this is done in real
life is unimportant for the purpose of this paper, but children and caregivers seem
to engage in joint attention quite frequently [52] and robots could do this using
pointing [50]. Weights are adapted following Hebbian learning, as explained in
Section 2.8.
Guessing game: The speaker does not inform the hearer about the topic, but the hearer has
to guess which object is the topic, given the context and the utterance. The hearer
then informs the speaker about its guess and the speaker provides the hearer with
(corrective) feedback about whether the hearer guessed right or not. It is unclear
5 In THSim, a third type of language game is implemented, which I have called the selfish game [55]. This game
implements a cross-situational statistical learner [64], which is based on the cross-situational learner proposed by
Siskind [37]. In cross-situational learning, the learner infers word-meanings from the co-variances of words with
their meanings across different contexts/situations. Currently, this game has only been implemented to simulate
lexicon formation.
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cate that they may [13]. Weights are adapted according to reinforcement learning.
These games differ mainly in the social strategy used to communicate, in particular with
respect to the information about the topic handed over to the hearer. As a consequence of
these different strategies, the learning mechanisms differ as well. For a comparison of these
models with respect to lexicon formation, consult [55,62].
It is important to note that at the start of each agent a’s lifetime, its ontology Oa and
grammar Ga are empty. Further, Oa and Ga are private representations and thus may differ
from one agent to another. How the ontologies are represented, used and constructed is
explained in Section 2.5. How the grammars are represented, used and induced is explained
in Sections 2.6, 2.7 and 3. First, however, the iterated learning model is introduced and then
the Talking Heads world is presented.
2.3. The iterated learning model
The iterated learning model (ILM) [6,7,23,26] is a generic framework for simulating
language evolution. The model (see Fig. 2) iterates over generations where the population
is divided into two groups: adults and learners. The adults have passed the stage of learners
and are assumed to have mastered the language. The learners enter the population as novice
language users and acquire the language from scratch by observing the behaviour of adult
speakers. The ILM cycles around iterations in which a given number of language games are
played. At the end of each iteration, the adults ‘die’ and are replaced by the learners, who
in turn are replaced by novel learners. This cycle then repeats. In short, the ILM involves a
simplified model of a population dynamics and vertical transmission of language, i.e., the
cultural transmission of language from one generation to the next where the output of one
generation is the input to the next generation.
In most implementations of the ILM, including the current, the agents of all generations
have the same ‘phenotype’, i.e., there is no biological adaptation but the languages evolve
Fig. 2. A schematic view of the iterated learning model. A population of agents A′ from generation G(n) acquires
the language L(n) by playing language games (as hearer) with agents A from generation G(n− 1). After a given
number of language games, generation G(n−1) ‘dies’ and a new generation G(n+1) is added to the population.
Now generation G(n) teaches this new generation and the cycle repeats.
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studied the effect of biological adaptations on the learnability of lexicons [40].
2.4. The Talking Heads world
In the Talking Heads simulation (Fig. 3) a population of agents evolve language to
communicate about their world. The world W consists of a set of geometrical coloured
objects oi ∈W , of which an arbitrarily selected subset of a fixed size appears at randomly
selected locations in a display to form the context C of a language game (upper left window
in Fig. 3). In all experiments reported in this paper, the context size was fixed at 8 objects.
Each object is described with six different perceptible features: the (r)ed, (g)reen
and (b)lue components of the rgb colour space, a (s)hape feature, and the (x) and (y)-
coordinates of the objects’ locations. In the current study, the agents only extract the first
four features (rgbs). All features have real values between 0 and 1 and are designed such
that they can be calculated by a real robot—in fact the features are highly similar to those
used in the real Talking Heads experiment [49].
The shape feature fs,i of object oi is calculated as follows:
fs,i = 2 Ai
Abb,i
− 1 (1)
Fig. 3. A screen shot of the THSim toolkit. The upper left window shows the context of a language game, the
upper right window contains the tool’s control panel, the lower left window shows the details of a language game,
and the lower right window shows some statistics of the simulation.
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be drawn around object i. For example, a circle has a shape feature of fs = 2 πr2(2r)2 − 1 =
π
2 − 1, squares have features fs = 1 and triangles features of fs = 0. The objects in the
world are designed such that for two different shapes shapei = shapej it holds that the
shape features are different, i.e., fs,i = fs,j (with the exception of squares and rectangles).
The world contains a total of 10 different shapes and 12 different colours, which are—
more or less—basic colours with a non-uniform distribution in the rgb space, but well
distinctive from each other. Each shape can be combined with each colour, hence the world
has 120 different objects. The objective of the simulation is that the population develops a
language from scratch to communicate successfully about their world.
2.5. The discrimination game
Each agent a constructs its private ontology Oa by playing discrimination games [44].
The objective of the discrimination game is to find one or more categories for an object
(the topic) that distinguishes this topic from all other objects in the context. In case of
failure, the agent expands its ontology in order to improve its discriminative ability for
future games. The ontology contains the basic building blocks for constructing the cat-
egories (or meanings), which the agents use as an internal representation of the world’s
objects.6 Categories are represented by prototypes c = (c1, . . . , cn), which are points in
an n-dimensional conceptual space [16]. The region in the space of which the points are
nearest to a prototype is defined as the category of this prototype.
The dimensions of the conceptual space are called quality dimensions [16], and it is
along these dimensions that the agents construct their ontology. The quality dimensions
the agents use are directly related to the feature qualities the agents detect when seeing
an object: r, g, b and s. With these qualities, the agents can construct various conceptual
spaces, such as, for instance, a colour space using rgb, a shape space using dimension s or
a ‘redgreen’ space using rg. For convenience, the spaces are denoted as a string indicating
their dimensions, such as rgbs denotes the conceptual space of all available dimensions.
For the sake of consistency, the meanings of sentences are assumed to cover all dimensions
rgbs. The meanings are stored in a holistic conceptual space (spanned by all dimensions),
or they can form a composition from other conceptual spaces, such as the colour space
combined with the shape space. Meanings cannot be constructed from overlapping spaces,
so combinations of rgb with gs are not allowed.
The basic units of the ontologies are called categorical features ci . These are points in
one dimension i, which segment dimension i into areas of which the categorical features
are the central points. Categories are constructed by combining the categorical features of
different dimensions. Combining the dimensions leads to the formation of a conceptual
space, as shown in Fig. 4.
6 Sometimes the term category is used instead of meaning. For convenience, these are used to denote a repre-
sentation. Obviously there are important differences between meanings and representations as I have discussed
elsewhere [56].
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space. The two quality dimensions red and green, each with three categorical features (points) form 3 regions in
each dimension (left). When combined, these dimensions form a conceptual space that has 9 different categories
(right). Note that the number of categorical features is not fixed, nor is the number of different conceptual spaces.
In a discrimination game, played by both the speaker and the hearer, each individual
agent tries to distinguish the topic ot ∈ C from all other objects in the context ok ∈ C\{ot }.
(In a guessing game, the hearer plays a discrimination game for each object in the context.)
Each agent a categorises all objects in the context oj ∈ C by taking for each feature fi,j
the categorical feature ci ∈Oa that is nearest to fi,j , and then combining each dimension
to form the category cj = (c1, . . . , cn). The topic’s category ct is distinctive if it is not a
category for any other object in the context, i.e., ∀oj ∈ C: oj = ot ⇒ cj = ct .
If the topic’s category is a distinctive category, it becomes the topic’s meaning mt .
Otherwise, the discrimination game fails—and consequently the whole language game
likewise—and the agent adds each of the topic’s features as exemplars of new categori-
cal features to its ontology Oa , unless the exemplar already exists in Oa .
One further remark on notation is required at this stage. Assuming the 4 quality dimen-
sions used in the current implementation, I denote an object’s category as a 4-dimensional
vector with the order rgbs. For example, a red square is written as (1,0,0,1). The mean-
ings from lower dimensional conceptual spaces are denoted differently. For example the
colour red is denoted by the list [1r,0g,0b] and the shape square is denoted by [1s]. I use
this distinction for convenience. The vector notation is a more common notation and stands
for the meaning as a whole. The list notation allows us to form more complex meanings
using its elements and combine them with possibly other lists, as will be described shortly.
2.6. The grammar
Each agent a constructs its private grammar Ga ontogenetically, starting from an initially
empty set. The grammar is defined as a set of rules R that are schemas (or rewrite rules),
which may be either holistic or compositional. Table 1 provides an example grammar. In
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An imaginary grammar used in the examples of the text. The rules are realistic with respect to the model, apart
from the strings which are based on English. In the model, strings are constructed from random letters taken from
a subset of the English alphabet. See the text for a detailed explanation
R1: S/rgbs → A/rgb B/s 0.85
R2: S/rgbs → B/s A/rgb 0.06
R3: S/rgbs → C/rb D/gs 0.1
R4: S/rgbs → redsquare/[10.25r ,00.2r ,00.25g ,00.2b ,10.1s ] 0.25
R5: A/rgb → blue/[00.2r ,00.2g ,10.2b ] 0.2
R6: A/rgb → yellow/[10.9r ,10.9g ,00.9b ] 0.9
R7: B/s → triangle/[00.8s ] 0.8
R8: B/s → double/[00.01s ] 0.01
R9: C/rb → rue/[10.1r ,10.1b ] 0.1
R10: D/gs → greenagon/[10.1g ,0.50.1s ] 0.1
R11: D/gs → double/[0.50.01g ,00.01s ] 0.01
this grammar, S, A, B, C and D are syntactic categories.7 The rules indicate how the left
hand sides rewrite to the right hand sides. Some rules (R1–R3) rewrite to compositional
rules and the others rewrite to single word utterances. The bold-face strings after the slashes
indicate the conceptual space which is covered by the syntactic category.
By definition, all sentences S cover all dimensions of the entire conceptual space rgbs;
the other syntactic categories cover a space of lower dimensionality, such as colour rgb
(A), shape s (B), ‘redblue’ rb (C) and ‘greenshape’ gs (D). The terminal slots (rules R4–
R11) rewrite to single words, such as “redsquare” and “blue”. (Note that R4 is a holistic
rule.) Sentences are defined to cover all dimensions in order to reduce the search space of
possibilities.
Compositions can be formed by applying terminal slots of the appropriate syntactic
category to compositional rules (using the composition operator ◦). For instance, rules R5
and R7 can be applied to rule R1 to form the composition R1 ◦ R5 ◦ R7, which rewrites to
the sentence “bluetriangle”. In addition, we can apply the same terminal slots to rule R2 to
form the composition R2 ◦ R7 ◦ R5 obtaining “triangleblue”. Both compositions have the
meaning (0,0,1,0). The meaning of a rule (and consequently the composition) is formed
from the categorical features listed between square brackets, as described below.
The categorical features are denoted as a value with its dimension in subscript and
its category weight w(ci) in superscript. For instance, 10.25r is a categorical feature in
the quality dimension for red (r) with a weight of w(1r) = 0.25. The features can be
combined to construct a meaning. Each possible meaning of R4 must cover the holistic
conceptual space of rgbs, so they must include a categorical feature from each dimension.
7 Although the rules make the grammar look context-free, it is not because in the current implementation, all
non-terminals of the sentence (i.e., A, B, C and D in the example) rewrite to terminals. Hence, the grammar is
finite. Strictly speaking, the grammar is also not regular, since the top rules can contain two non-terminals, but
the grammar could be represented by a regular grammar. Future research aims to extend the current model to
grammars that are context-free.
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thus m′4 = (1,0,0,1) representing a red square and m′′4 = (0,0,0,1) representing a black
square. We can calculate the meaning weights w for these meanings as the average of the
category weights used in the meaning. So, meaning m′4 has meaning weight w′4 = 0.20 and
m′′4 has meaning weight w′′4 = 0.19. In general, the meaning weights are calculated as the






where di is the dimension of the rule’s covering conceptual space. The category weights
w(cj,k) are updated to indicate how well they have been used to construct the rule’s mean-
ing (Section 2.8). So, in the example, rule m′4 represents R4 better than m′′4, because
0.20 > 0.19. The agents use these weights to learn the proper meaning of a rule, based
on a selectionist competition.
Each rule Ri further has a rule weight ρi , as given in the final column of Table 1, which
indicates the effectiveness of the rule in previous language games. Given these weights one
can calculate the score si of rule Ri by:
si =
{
ρiwi if Ri has specified meanings,
ρi if Ri rewrites into non-terminals.
(3)
If we have a composition
⊕
Ri to form a sentence with one or more components Ri , we
can attribute a score to this composition. This score σ(
⊕
Ri) is the product of the rules’












Ri is a shorthand for the composition. Suppose we have the composition R1 ◦
R5 ◦ R7 to mean (0,0,1,0), then
σ(R1 ◦ R5 ◦ R7) = s1 · s5 · s7 = (0.85) ·
(









In contrast, the competing composition R2 ◦ R7 ◦ R5, with the same meaning, has score
σ(R2 ◦ R7 ◦ R5) = (0.06) ·
(











Ri) is used to select among competing rules when encoding or decoding
an expression.
The arithmetic mean is used for calculating the meaning weights and the product is used
when calculating the scores, in an analogy with probabilities. In this analogy, the selection
of category features is considered as an independent process (hence summation), but the
construction of compositions is not (hence multiplication).
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Encoding and decoding are straightforward techniques to match the meaning of the
language game’s topic with a set of possible compositions or to match an expression and
(possible) meaning with a set of compositions. When there are multiple ways of encod-
ing or decoding an expression, then the composition with the highest score σ(
⊕
Ri) is
selected. Encoding and decoding can be described as follows:
Encoding: If a speaker/teacher tries to produce an expression, it searches for all possible
compositions in its grammar that match the meaning. For example, if the speaker
tries to encode an utterance for meaning (0,0,1,0) using the grammar shown in
Table 1, it will come up with compositions R1 ◦R5 ◦R7 and R2 ◦R7 ◦R5. Based
on the scores calculated as described in Eq. (4) above, the speaker will select the
highest scoring composition and produces the utterance “bluetriangle”.
Decoding: If a hearer receives an utterance, it will interpret the expression. (Utterances
are received without word boundaries, so there may be different ways to segment
a sentence.) The hearer creates a temporary list by searching its grammar for
compositions that decode the utterance and removes from this list all compositions
whose semantics do not match any of the possible meanings in the given language
game. In the current implementation of the observational game, there is only one
possible meaning, but in the guessing game there are typically more.
Suppose, for example, the hearer receives the utterance “bluetriangle” in an
observational game with the topic’s meaning (0,0,1,0). Further assume that the
hearer has the grammar of Table 1. The utterance is then interpreted with compo-
sition R1 ◦ R5 ◦ R7, which the hearer selects as interpretation. If there are more
possible parses, the hearer selects the one with the highest score σ(
⊕
Ri). In this
example, the observational game is a success, because the hearer found an inter-
pretation matching the topic’s meaning. If the topic has a different meaning, the
observational game fails.
Now suppose that the hearer receives the utterance “redsquare” in a guess-
ing game with a context of three categorised objects: a red square with meaning
m1 = (1,0,0,1), a black square with m2 = (0,0,0,1) and a yellow square m3 =
(1,1,0,1). The utterance can be interpreted in two ways, both using the holistic
composition R4. The interpretation matching m1 has a score of σ(R4)′ = 0.050
and the one matching m2 yields σ(R4)′′ = 0.047. The hearer selects m1 as the
topic’s meaning and if this topic (the red square) is the object intended by the
speaker, the guessing game succeeds, otherwise there is a mismatch in reference
and the game fails.
2.8. Adaptation of weights
When the language game has finished, the effectiveness of the game is evaluated. De-
pending on the outcome, both agents adapt the weights which they use to calculate the
scores:
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weights ρi of the rules Ri that are part of the composition according to:
ρi = η · ρi + 1 − η (5)
where η = 0.9 is a constant learning parameter. In addition, rules Rj that are part
of a competing composition are laterally inhibited following:
ρj = η · ρj . (6)
Furthermore, the weights of the categorical features that constitute the meaning
of the successfully used rules are increased by
w(ci,k) = η · w(ci,k) + 1 − η. (7)
The competing categorical features in the same rules and the categorical features
that constitute competing rules are inhibited:
w(cj,k) = η · w(cj,k). (8)
Mismatch: (Guessing game only.) In case of a mismatch, only the hearer decreases the
weights of the rules and its used categorical features according to:
ρi = η · ρi (9)
and
w(ci,k) = η · w(ci,k). (10)
Note that the lateral inhibition of the rule weight ρj helps to disambiguate different
grammatical structures, while the lateral inhibition of the categorical features’ weights
w(cj , k) helps to disambiguate the meaning of a rule. Rules are said to compete if they are
part of a composition that parsed the distinctive category (speaker) or utterance (hearer),
but were not selected.
The equations ensure that the weights remain between 0 and 1, while the choice of
η = 0.9 allows the weights to maintain a rather long history of past experiences. The choice
of this update rule is not extremely important (Steels and Kaplan, for instance, use a dif-
ferent update rule [48]), but it has been found that the current equations work better than
when associations are updated using a frequency counter, together with a Bayesian learn-
ing model. This is mainly because with the currently used functions, the scores fluctuate
faster, thus strengthening competition, than would be the case in a probabilistic model.
3. Grammar induction
If the speaker cannot produce an utterance or if the hearer fails to interpret an utterance,
the agent in question has to expand its linguistic knowledge. The speaker may invent new
knowledge and the hearer may induce new knowledge. New compositional structures can
only be constructed by the hearer.
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If a speaker is not able to produce an utterance, the grammar is insufficient to encode the
meaning and new knowledge has to be invented. This is done in one of the two following
ways: exploitation and holistic creation. These invention mechanisms are similar to those
used in [23,24].
Exploitation: The speaker does not invent new compositional rules, but can exploit an
existing rule if this rule is able to encode a part of the sentence. For instance, if
a speaker with the grammar of Table 1 wishes to produce an utterance to express
the meaning (0,0,1,1), then both the compositions R1 ◦ R5 ◦ ? and R2 ◦ ? ◦ R5
produce a partial encoding covering the meaning part [0r,0g,1b]. The speaker
then invents a new rule in which it associates the complement of the meaning, [1s]
with a newly constructed word, such as “rectangle”. This leads to the construction
of the new rule:
R12: B/s → rectangle/[10.01s ] 0.01.
This rule is then immediately applied to utter the expression “bluerectangle” using
composition R1 ◦ R5 ◦ R12, which has the highest score (σ(R1 ◦ R5 ◦ R12) =
3.4 × 10−6 and σ(R2 ◦ R12 ◦ R5) = 2.4 × 10−7).
Holistic creation: If the speaker cannot encode any part of the topic’s meaning, then a
holistic rule is created. For instance, no part of meaning (0,1,1,1) can be en-
coded with the grammar given in Table 1. Hence, a new word is created and the
association is added to the grammar. For example, the speaker might add rule
R12: S/rgbs → cyanrectangle/[00.01r ,10.01g ,10.01b ,10.01s ] 0.01
to its grammar. This rule is immediately incorporated to produce the utterance
“cyanrectangle”.
In the above examples, words are constructed based on English for illustrative purposes
only. In the simulation, words are constructed as random strings of letters from a given
alphabet Σ . The strings have a length 2  l  8 where the length follows a probability
distribution of f (l) ∝ 1/l, which is typical for human languages [68]. When new rules or
meanings are added to the grammar, all weights are initialised with value w(c) = ρ = 0.01.
3.2. Interpretation and induction
When the hearer is not able to decode an utterance, the hearer has to induce the ut-
terance’s meaning, such that it is consistent with the speaker’s intention. In case of the
observational game the hearer already knows the topic, in the case of the guessing game
the speaker will now hand over this information. The core of our interest now lies in the
grammar induction, which at this stage is the same for both the observational and guessing
game.
In modern psycholinguistics it is widely assumed that humans learn grammar from
observing other humans’ linguistic behaviours, e.g., [28,29,53], rather than by tuning pa-
rameters in relation to some innate universal grammar as proposed by Chomsky [12].
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and children reveal that children seem to gradually construct grammatical schemas based
on similarities (or alignments) found in different sentences used by their caregivers.
Consider, for example, the following two sentences:
(1) I love Mum.
(2) I love Maria.
If a learner hears these two phrases for the first time, then the learner can infer that both
‘Mum’ and ‘Maria’ belong to the same linguistic category, and that the segment ‘I love’
belongs to something else.
This type of learning has been implemented computationally as an alignment-based
learner (ABL) [54], where the learner induces grammatical structures from sentences
stored in linguistic corpora. This learner is based on alignment learning combined with
some selection criterion. Van Zaanen has shown that calculating the probability of hy-
potheses based on past experiences yields a good selection criterion. The current model
implements ABL, but incorporates a selection criterion based on the weights as explained
in the previous section. (Kirby’s models [22–24], too, uses alignment learning, but his more
recent models [23,24] are without any selection criteria.)
Basically, there are three different induction mechanisms: exploitation, chunking and
incorporation. These induction mechanisms are followed by an additional step called gen-
eralise and merge explained in Section 3.3.
Exploitation: Exploitation is used when the learner is capable of decoding only a part
of the sentence. In that case, the learner adds a new rule to cover the remaining
part of the sentence, similar to the speaker’s exploitation rule. Again consider
the grammar of Table 1. When the hearer receives the expression “bluerectangle”
to mean (0,0,1,1), this parses partially to the composition R1 ◦ R5◦?, covering
meaning [0r,0g,1b]. In this case a new rule is constructed with non-terminal B as
its head, the word “rectangle” and meaning [10.01s ]; i.e., rule
R12: B/s → rectangle/[10.01s ] 0.01
is added to the learner’s grammar. (Note that the utterance does not partially de-
code into R2◦? ◦ R5 because of the wrong word order in this composition.)
Chunking: Chunking is incorporated when an utterance-meaning pair is not (partially)
parseable, but when a part of the utterance-meaning pair aligns with stored holistic
rules, or more precisely with stored utterance-meaning pairs. In each game where
the hearer receives an utterance and successfully categorises the topic, it stores the
utterance-meaning pair in the set of instances I , such as shown in Table 2. When
an utterance cannot be decoded or exploited, then the learner searches alignments
between utterances and stored instances. For each found alignment, the learner
also checks for alignments at the semantic level. For the instances that have align-
ments at the semantic and utterance level, the learner keeps track of the frequency
with which these instances have been observed previously. The learner then de-
cides to make a split where it appears most effective based on the frequencies or,
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An example list of stored instances of utterances (1st column), their








in case of a tie, based on the largest common chunk. It then will add the new rules
to the grammar as illustrated in the following example. (Note that the incorpora-
tion of an instance-base deviates from Van Zaanen’s ABL and is inspired by the
memory-based learning techniques, which uses nearest neighbourhood classifica-
tion, as used in [14].)
Suppose, for example, the hearer receives the word “redcircle” with meaning
(1,0,0,0.57). The following alignments will then be found in Table 2.
f instance utterance
a. 3 redsquare (1,0,0,1) redcircle (1,0,0,0.57)
b. 3 redsquare (1,0,0,1) redcircle (1,0,0,0.57)
c. 3 bluetriangle (0,0,1,0) redcircle (1,0,0,0.57)
d. 3 yellowtriangle (1,1,0,0) redcircle (1,0,0,0.57)
e. 2 ruegreenagon (1,1,1,0.5) redcircle (1,0,0,0.57)
f. 1 ruedouble (1,0.5,1,0) redcircle (1,0,0,0.57)
g. 1 ruedouble (1,0.5,1,0) redcircle (1,0,0,0.57)
Two notes are necessary here: 1) Alignments can only be made either at the
start or at the end of an utterance, so alignments “redcircle”, “redcircle” and
“redcircle” are not allowed. This restriction does not hold at the semantic level.
For example, the semantic alignment between (1,0,1,0) and (1,1,1,1) is valid.
With this restriction, it is assumed that connected parts in the string belong to one
part of the meaning, which in future models may be further decomposed, and—
above all—it prevents the emergence of meaningless substrings as was the case
in Kirby’s models [23,24]. And 2) “greendouble” is also not taken, because there
is no alignment in the semantics.
The selection of which chunks are made now follows two criteria:
(1) The frequencies of identical chunks in the utterance are summed. This yields
three possible chunks with a maximum total frequency of 3:
(i) redcircle with (1,0,0,0.57) according to (a),
(ii) redcircle with (1,0,0,0.57) according to (b), and
(iii) redcircle with (1,0,0,0.57) according to (e) and (g).
(2) The chunk that has the largest syntactic alignment is selected.
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S/rgbs → E/rgb F/s 0.01
R13: E/rgb → red/[10.01r ,00.01g ,00.01b ] 0.01
R14: F/s → square/[10.01s ] 0.01
R15: F/s → circle/[0.570.01s ] 0.01.
This will lead to some redundancy, because R12 is – apart from the non-terminal
labels—the same rule as R1. However, this will be repaired in the generalise and
merge step described shortly.
Incorporation: The incorporation is done when no compositional structure can be in-
duced. In this case, the utterance-meaning pair is adopted holistically. For instance
the reception of utterance “lightgraycircle” with meaning (0.25,0.25,0.25,0.57)
would result in the incorporation of:
R12: S/rgbs → lightgraycircle/[0.250.01r ,0.250.01g ,0.250.01b ,
0.570.01s ] 0.01
It is important to note that in the instance-base I all instances are stored the way they
are received. This is in contrast to the grammar, which stores the way they can be rewrit-
ten; thus the instance-base allows the learner to search all instances they way they have
been heard, which aids in finding an effective way to chunk up utterances based on past
experiences, while not being restricted by previously made compositions which may not
be effective. Moreover, the instance-based alignment learning can be used to ‘unlearn‘ a
previously learnt rule, when—based on later instances—other rules can describe the data
better. Although it is unclear as to what extent humans store both whole utterances as ex-
emplars and generalisations of these, there is growing evidence that both types of storage
are used [29]. Most convincing evidence of this dual storage is found in relation with the
storage of morphologically complex words [1].
These induction mechanisms differ from Kirby’s model [23,24] mainly in four ways.
First, the exploitation rule is an implicit property of Kirby’s chunking mechanism. Sec-
ond, Kirby’s chunking mechanism allows alignments to be unconnected (as in reddouble),
which, as mentioned, can lead to the emergence of substrings that have no semantic con-
tent, but it can also lead to an explosion of string length [42]. Third, the current chunking
mechanism uses an instance-base for finding effective chunks. In Kirby’s model, learners
are restricted by previously made constructions, so they cannot unlearn a previously learnt
compositions. This is also partly caused by the fourth difference with Kirby’s model, where
new rules subsume old ones which are deleted from the grammar. In this model, all rules
are memorised, even the old ones, which allows the adaptation of weights to serve as a
competitive selection mechanism, giving way for a self-organisation of language [45].
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When new rules are induced, there may emerge some redundancies and other side ef-
fects that need to be dealt with. In order to deal with this, two post-operations have been
introduced: generalise and merge.
Generalise: The generalisation step serves to exploit more regularities than was done in
the chunking step. For example, suppose an agent has the following two rules in
its grammar:
R1: S/rgbs → bluecircle/[00.2r ,00.2g ,10.2b ,0.570.2s ] 0.2
R2: S/rgbs → yellowsquare/[10.5r ,10.5g ,00.5b ,10.5s ] 0.5.
Further suppose that the utterance-meaning pair “bluesquare”-(0,0,1,1) was
chunked with R2—e.g., because its aligning instances had a higher occurrence
frequency—so that the following rules were added:
R3: S/rgbs → A/rgb B/s 0.01
R4: A/rgb → blue/[00.01r ,00.01g ,10.01b ] 0.01
R5: A/rgb → yellow/[10.01r ,10.01g ,00.01b ] 0.01
R6: B/s → square/[10.01s ] 0.01.
The agent missed the opportunity to chunk rule R1. This is fixed by the generali-
sation step, which will add the rule
R7: B/s → circle/[0.570.01s ] 0.01
to the grammar as well. Effectively, the generalisation step chunks all possible
rules that fits the initial chunk.
Merge: The merge step is adapted from Kirby’s model [23,24] and serves to reduce redun-
dancy in the grammar. Two types of merging are applied. First, rules with different
non-terminal labels that are effectively the same are merged. For instance, in the
‘chunking’ example of the previous subsection, the following rules were induced.
R12: S/rgbs → E/rgb F/s 0.01
R13: E/rgb → red/[10.01r ,00.01g ,00.01b ] 0.01
R14: F/s → square/[10.01s ] 0.01
R15: F/s → circle/[0.570.01s ] 0.01.
R12 is a copy of rule R1 in Table 1, only with different labels on the non-terminals.
The merging step merges these two rules (i.e., R12 is removed) and then renames
the labels E and F into A and B resp. for rules R13–R15. Second, rules that have
the same non-terminal labels (or even different ones) and the same word-forms,
but with different meanings covering the same conceptual space are merged. For
example, the rules
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Rj : F/s → square/[0.80.01s ] 0.01
are merged into:
Ri : E/s → square/[10.21s ,0.80.01s ] 0.22
where the scores of the two rules are added.
4. Experimental results
With the above models, three conditions were investigated whose results are presented
in this section without any additional discussions and clarifications; these are presented in
the next section. The first experiment is used as a baseline experiment. In this experiment,
the observational game and the guessing game were run with a population size of 2 (1 adult
and 1 learner). Although this is not a realistic population size, it allows us to investigate
the basic behaviour of the model and is a typical setting for most ILM studies, e.g., [6,23].
Each agent, including the agents of the first iteration, started with an empty ontology and
grammar. In the current experiments, the adult of the first iteration constructed the first
version of the language, which then evolved over the iterations. As the speakers cannot
invent compositional structures, the language of the first adult was holistic.
The second set of experiments investigates the effect of increasing the population size
from 2 to 6. In this experiment, the population contained 3 adults and 3 learners, where
the speakers of the language games are selected from the adult population and the hear-
ers from the learner population. This set of experiments was carried without imposing a
transmission bottleneck.
In the third set of experiments, a bottleneck on the transmission of language was im-
posed, both with a population size of 2 and 6. A bottleneck on the transmission means that
each learner learns from its teachers by observing only a part of the teacher’s language.
When the learners becomes adults, they teach the next generation over another part of the
language. In this set of experiments, a bottleneck was imposed by selecting a subset of the
world as the set of objects from which contexts were selected. This subset differed in each
learning episode (or iteration), but its size remained fixed at 50% (i.e., the agents in each
iteration only observed 60 of the 120 objects). It has been shown in various studies with
the ILM that imposing a bottleneck on the transmission of the language provides a strong
external pressure on the emergence of compositional structures [6,23,41,69].
For all conditions, simulations were done with the observational game (OG) and the
guessing game (GG). The simulations were run for 250 iterations of N language games
each, where N = 2,500 if the population size is 2, and N = 6,000 if the population size
is 6. The N language games within an iteration form the training phase. At the end of
each iteration, before the adults were replaced by the learners and new learners entered
the population, all agents were tested on a number of situations for certain aspects of their
communicative ability. In this test phase, 200 language games were played with the adap-
tation and induction turned off, and where in each game each agent encodes an utterance
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pressed by the other agents. Whether or not a transmission bottleneck was imposed during
the training phase, the test phase was always done with all 120 objects.
For each experiment, 10 different trials were run with different random seeds. Some re-
sults are presented as averages over the 10 different trials and—where necessary—together
with their standard deviations. The results will be presented using 4 different measures cal-
culated during the testing phase: compositionality, production coherence, interpretation
accuracy and similarity.
Compositionality: The proportion of expressions that were encoded or decoded using
compositional rules during the testing phase.
(Production) coherence: The fraction of agents that produced the same utterance to name
objects during the testing phase, averaged over the 200 games played during this
phase. (Note that this measure disregards whether the agents used the same gram-
matical rules.)
(Communicative) accuracy: The fraction of agents that could successfully interpret the
produced utterances of the other agents in the population, averaged over the num-
ber of games played during the testing phase.
Similarity: The average proportion of the grammars of adults that are acquired by the
learners at the end of an iteration. This is based on internal inspection, rather than
on the testing situations.
All measures, except similarity, are reported graphically.
4.1. Baseline experiments
The first set of experiments investigated the behaviour of both the OG and GG with a
population size of 2 and without imposing a transmission bottleneck.
Fig. 5 shows the results of the baseline experiments for the OG (top) and the GG
(bottom). Compositionality (graphs on the left) rose in both experiments swiftly to lev-
els around 0.8. For the OG, this occurred already after two iterations; for the GG this took
about 10 iterations. After that, compositionality in the OG fluctuated in general between
0.7 and 0.9, but with quite some drastic catastrophes where compositionality nearly disap-
peared for short periods. Compositionality evolved to an average of 0.73 ± 0.24 at the end
of the final iteration. This means that at some points the languages changed from composi-
tional languages into holistic ones, though each time compositionality reappeared. The GG
revealed similar catastrophes in compositionality, though less frequently. In addition, the
general trend revealed an increase in compositionality to an average level of 0.89 ± 0.07 at
the end of the experiment.
Communicative accuracy for both game types also rose rapidly to values between 0.8
and 0.9 (Fig. 5 centre column). Although accuracy in the OG was not affected strongly
from the fluctuations in compositionality, in the GG this was the case. Each time composi-
tionality decreased, accuracy also decreased.
Coherence (graphs on the right) revealed more differences between the OG and the GG.
Whereas coherence fluctuated largely between 0.4 and 0.8 in the OG without any clear in-
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Table 3
A fragment of a grammar that emerged in one of the baseline simulations of the guessing game
Adult Learner
1 S → lfmia/[0r ,0g,0b, .78s , .67s ] 1.00 S → lfmia/[0r ,0g,0b, .67s , .78s ] 0.92
2 S → A/s B/rgb 0.99 S → A/s B/rgb 1.00
3 S → B/rgb A/s 5.7E–5 S → B/rgb A/s 0.06
4 S → C/r D/gbs 1.2E–5 S → C/r D/gbs 0.11
5 S → ibfdib/[1r , .75g, .75b, .5s ] 0.11
6 A → ibf/[.5s ] 1.00 A → ibf/[.5s ] 1.00
7 A → fdjdgdmf/[0s ] 1.00 A → fdjdgdmf/[0s ] 1.00
8 A → ide/[.63s , .67s ] 0.98 A → ide/[.64s , .67s , .66s ] 0.94
9 A → boncm/[.59s ] 0.98 A → boncm/[.59s , .58s ] 0.83
10 A → b/[.11s ] 0.77 A → ggdkab/[.59s ] 0.20
11 B → dib/[1r , .75g, .75b, .69g, .69b] 0.98 B → dib/[1r , .69g, .69b] 1.00
12 B → fkm/[1r ,0g,0b] 0.96 B → fkm/[1r ,0g,0b] 1.00
13 B → m/[1r ,0g,1b] 0.87 B → m/[1r ,0g,1b] 1.00
14 S → dggdkab/[0r ,0g,1b, .59s ] 0.20 B → d/[0r ,0g,1b] 0.02
15 C → b/[1r ] 0.08 C → b/[1r ,0r ] 0.10
16 S → bgl/[0r ,0g,1b, .62s ] 0.11 D → gl/[0g,1b, .61s , .62s ] 0.11
17 D → oncmm/[0g,1b, .58s ] 0.01 D → oncmm/[0g,1b, .58s ] 0.01
creasing trend, coherence in the GG showed a steady increase toward values near 1 similar
to the trend of compositionality, although the GG, too, revealed some large fluctuations.
Table 3 shows a fragment of the grammars of one adult and one learner at the end of a
typical iteration in one simulation run of the GG. The fragment is rather small; typically
learners acquired approximately 100–125 rules and adults ended up with more or less 125–
150 rules. The adult of this particular example acquired 161 rules, the learner 110. In the
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and compositional rules (2–4). It is interesting to note that the rule weights of the learner’s
compositional rules are higher than those acquired by the adult. The table also shows how
the adult’s holistic rules 14 and 16 have become compositional in the learner’s grammar.
(Learner rules 3, 10 and 14 can decode adult rule 14, and the learner rules 4, 15 and 16
decode adult rule 16.) Rules concerning the expression “ibfdib” show a meaning shift
(rules 2, 5, 6, 11). Note that the adult has two ways to construct “ibfdib”. The grammar
also contains some ambiguities in the form of polysemy (adult rules 1, 10, 11 and 15, and
learner rules 1 and 15) and synonymy (learner rules 9 and 10). One could argue that rules
8, 9 and 16 are also polysemous, but the ambiguous categories are so close to each other
that one also could argue that they constitute only one meaning.
Summarising, with a population of size 2, both the current OG and GG models show
that compositionality can be achieved, even in the absence of a transmission bottleneck.
The GG, however, appears more stable than the OG, but neither is completely stable.
4.2. Increasing population size
In the second experiment series, the population size is increased from 2 to 6, which
means that the population in these experiments consisted of 3 adults and 3 learners.
Fig. 6 shows the results of this experiment. For both the OG and GG, compositional-
ity increased to a high level in the first few iterations. After that, compositionality soon
decreased. For the OG, the final value of compositionality was on average 0.22 ± 0.10;
for the GG this was 0.16 ± 0.11. This decrease was more drastic and instable for the OG
than for the GG, where in some runs compositionality remained for a while or even re-
covered. It is striking to see that in the OG accuracy seems to benefit from the decrease
in compositionality (it rose to 0.83 ± 0.05). The opposite is true for the GG, where accu-
Fig. 6. The results of the experiments with a population size of 6. The figures show the results of the observational
games (top) and guessing games (bottom) on compositionality (left), accuracy (centre) and coherence (right).
Again, each line represents one simulation run.
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for the baseline experiments of the observational game (OG) and the guessing game (GG). The types of rules are
A: S → rgb s, B: S → s rgb, C: S → r gbs, D: holistic rules, and E: all other rules.
racy first decreased with the drop in compositionality, but then recovered slightly to a final
value of 0.64 ± 0.06. In both cases, coherence increased gradually to various levels. In the
OG, coherence reached a level of 0.57 ± 0.09, and in the GG a level of 0.82 ± 0.07 was
reached. So, compositionality appears to have an antagonising effect on coherence: when
compositionality decreases, coherence increases.
When looking at the grammars that evolved, we can measure various things. Similarity,
for instance, measures the proportion with which the learner population has acquired the
grammars of the adult population. At the end of the 250st iteration, similarity was found to
be 0.71 ± 0.05 for the OG and 0.66 ± 0.07 for the GG. Throughout the evolutions, these
values remained fairly constant.
Fig. 7 shows a distribution of different types of rules that emerged as dominant rules for
an agent in an iteration. A rule is assumed to be dominant if it is used most frequently by an
agent within one iteration. Since the most prominent structure in the environment combines
colours with shapes, it is expected that if this structure is exploited most frequently, a
dominance of rules of types A and B (i.e., rules that combine colour with shape) would be
observed. In fact, the most dominant compositional rule found in both the OG and GG is
one that combines the r component with the conceptual space covering gbs. Analysis of
the rgb space for the used colours actually shows that for some colours the combination
with equal values in the r dimension and different values in the gbs space occurs up to 5
times more often. However, as we would expect, given the low levels of compositionality,
the most frequently used rules in all these experiments were holistic rules (type D).
4.3. Imposing a transmission bottleneck
The third set of experiments is used to investigate what happens when a bottleneck on
transmission is imposed. Fig. 8 shows the results of imposing a bottleneck of 50% on a
population of size 2. Only compositionality is shown, which in both cases increase rapidly
to a high level and remain there throughout the evolution. With 0.90 ± 0.06 composition-
ality in the GG is higher at the end than in the OG, which yielded 0.81 ± 0.08.
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are shown for the OG (left) and GG (right).
Fig. 9. The results of the experiments with a population size of 6 and a transmission bottleneck of 50%. The
figures show the results of the observational games (top) and guessing games (bottom) on compositionality (left),
accuracy (center) and coherence (right).
Fig. 9 shows the results of the simulations with a population of size 6 and a bottleneck
of 50%. For the OG (top), compositionality tended to remain longer in the simulations than
without a bottleneck, but at some point the languages colapsed into holistic systems within
a few iterations (average of 0.23 ± 0.10 at the end). Whenever this happened accuracy and
coherence jumped to a higher level. In the case of accuracy, this jump was from around
0.50 to 0.75; for coherence this was from around 0.16 to around 0.51. Similarity decreased
slightly (±0.05) with an overall average value of 0.71 ± 0.02 at the end.
The GG (bottom) increased very rapidly to a high and stable level of compositionality in
all runs (an average of 0.94 ± 0.02 at the end). This was followed by accuracy, which rose
rapidly to a level of around 0.8 after which it slowly kept on rising toward an average level
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the guessing game (GG) with a 50% bottleneck. The percentages relate to the rules of type A: S → rgb s, B:
S → s rgb, C: S → r gbs, D: holistic rules, and E: rest.
Fig. 11. Compositionality for various transmission bottlenecks for a population size of 6. A transmission bottle-
neck of 0% means that all objects were used in the training phase. The results are shown for the final (250st)
iteration of the OG (left) and GG (right).
of 0.85 ± 0.05 in the end. Coherence yielded more fluctuations throughout the evolution,
but its trend increased to an average value of 0.75 ± 0.10. After a sharp decrease of around
0.10 points in the first few iterations, similarity remained more or less constant with an
overall average value of 0.65 ± 0.02.
Fig. 10 shows the distribution of dominant rules used throughout the experiments with
a bottleneck of 50%. As could be expected, given the low level of compositionality, the
distribution of the OG is much the same as without a bottleneck (Fig. 7), showing a peak
in the holistic rules. As for the GG, nearly all dominant rules combine colours with shape,
most of which prefer the word order with shape first (i.e., rules of type B: S → s rgb).
This, therefore, nicely reflects the environment’s structures.
Fig. 11 shows what happens to the level of compositionality at the end of the exper-
iments when the bottleneck is varied from 0 to 50% (0% bottleneck means all objects
are passed—i.e., there is no bottleneck). In all simulations with the OG, compositionality
did not remain stable and eventually disappeared (as in the previous experiments, com-
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low standard deviation for bottlenecks of 25% or higher. When the bottleneck was 8.3%
or 16.7%, a moderate level of compositionality was reached with a large standard devia-
tion. (The large standard deviation indicates that sometimes compositionality was present,
sometimes not.) Only when no bottleneck was imposed on the GG, compositionality did
not remain stable.
5. Discussion
The previous section presented the results of the experiments done; in this section I will
try to explain why the results are the way they are. After comparing the current model with
some closely related work, I will discuss the rapid emergence of compositionality. Then
I will discuss factors of instability with a primary focus on the differences between the
observational and guessing games. The effect of increasing the population size is discussed
in Section 5.4, after which I discuss the effect of the transmission bottleneck in Section 5.5.
5.1. Related work
The current work is mostly related to the iterated learning model developed by Kirby
[23,24]. Kirby’s model starts with a population of size 2 (1 adult and 1 learner). Like in
the current study, the adult produces utterances from which the learner learns its language.
When the learner receives an utterance, it also observes its meaning. These meanings are
predefined predicate argument structures of the form p(x) or r(x,y). Apart from the se-
lectionist learning mechanism and the instance-base used in the current paper, the learning
mechanisms of both models are basically the same. The first major novelty in the current
study is that the agents develop their own semantics and thus discover their own seman-
tic structures, which reflect the combinatorial structure imposed by the environment. (This
aspect is further elaborated in Section 5.2, but see also [60].) The second novelty is the ap-
plication of the guessing game, including its selectionist learning mechanism. In this game,
the learner only observes a context of possible objects from which it has to guess what the
speaker’s topic is. Kirby’s model is more closely related to the observational game, in that
the hearer/learner receives both the utterance and topic (albeit the exact meaning in Kirby’s
model and only the reference in this model). The third important novelty—with respect to
Kirby’s model—is the increased population size, but that has also been studied in [42].
Other related models using a ‘Kirby’ style implementation of the ILM are found in [6,41,
69]. All these studies predefine the semantics and have a population size of 2.
The learning mechanism is highly similar to Van Zaanen’s alignment based learner [54],
although he combines the alignment-based learner with probabilistic grammar inducers,
similar to those described in [5]. Similar learning mechanisms have also been studied
in [15,51]. Again, the main difference with these models—apart from its implementa-
tion in an evolutionary model—is that the semantics of the language develops from the
agents perceptions of the world. Another difference is that alignments are derived from
an instance-base that stores utterance-meaning pairs together with some new information,
rather than combining the existing grammar with the new information. The reason for this
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chunk up utterance-meaning pairs than could be done when only the grammar is used, un-
less the grammar is build using all possible parse-trees as is done in [5,54]. The problem
with constructing all parse-trees is that in the current model it is unknown where the most
optimal word boundaries are. Hence, there would be an extremely large number of rules
that need to be stored. Alternatively, the model could rely only on the instance-base and
use memory-based learning as in [14]. The problem there is its computational complexity.
The current model has the advantage of relatively fast parsing (decoding), and only has to
generalise from the instance-base in case of failures. (Note that Gong et al. [17] use a sim-
ilar approach to study the emergence of compositionality, but they store an instance-base
of utterance-meaning pairs in a buffer. If their buffer is full, they induce generalising rules
and then empty the buffer.) Although the current implementation is still unrealistic, there
is an increasing amount of evidence supporting the hypothesis of a dual storage of both
exemplars and generalisations, e.g., [1,29].
Another related piece of work is by Steels and co-workers. First, the Talking Heads
simulation is derived from Steels’ Talking Heads experiment (TH) [49], which was an
experiment studying the evolution of lexicons. Although slightly different, the input to the
agents in the current simulation is very similar to the input that the TH received. In addition,
where the TH used binary trees to represent categories, here categories are represented
as ‘prototypical’ categories without a hierarchical layering. Furthermore, the TH allowed
every combination of quality dimension to serve as a meaning, while here all 4 dimensions
were required to form the meaning of the whole. (This was done in order to keep the current
model simple; future work will allow more complex possibilities.) Recently, Steels has
moved to a system in which robots (again embodied as cameras) develop a case-grammar
from analysing scenes played in front of the camera [46]. This closely related work is far
more complex than the current model, but seems to assume more. For instance, the lexicon
and consequently the meanings are predefined—this omits the co-evolution of language
and meaning, which may alter the outcome as we shall see shortly. In addition, the model
does not have a population turnover, which is also true for Batali’s [2] and Gong et al.’s
[17] models. As the current model has shown, successful development of compositionality
in the first iterations is no guarantee for success in later iterations. However, Steels’ model
relies heavily on the production of grammatical structures by the speakers and a recent
study has shown that when the learners in the current model also act as speakers (i.e., they
can speak to other learners or adults), compositionality remains stable, even in absence of
a transmission bottleneck [61].
5.2. The rapid emergence of compositionality
In most studies on the emergence of compositional structures using the iterated learn-
ing model, compositionality emerges at later stages of the evolution, e.g., [23,24]. So, why
does compositionality emerge so rapidly in these experiments? To understand this rapid
emergence, let us look at some differences between Kirby’s model [23,24] and the current
model. In Kirby’s model, compositional rules can emerge, in which parts of an expression
may have no semantic content. As a result, an uncontrolled growth of signal length can
occur [42] and the chance of discovering alignments in the expressions is relatively low,
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ing algorithm is more restricted to split up expressions into two distinct substrings, each
part of which must be semantically covered by a part of the whole meaning. In addition,
this model has an inbuilt bias toward shorter strings. Following Zipf’s law [68], the fre-
quency distribution f of words with string length l is inversely proportional to this length,
i.e., f ∝ l−α , where α ≈ 1. Together with an alphabet size of 15 letters, the probability
of finding aligning strings from the randomly generated words are high. A recent unpub-
lished study, where the alphabet size was varied between 5 and 25, has revealed that when
the alphabet size increases, the level of compositionality in the second iteration decreases
proportionally. The level of compositionality at the end for a GG with 50% bottleneck,
however was unaffected.
A second difference between Kirby’s models and this one lies in the development of
semantics. In Kirby’s models, the semantics are predefined, but in the current model they
are constructed during development. Recent analysis has shown that when agents have to
discover a semantic structure from the Talking Heads environment, there are more pos-
sible combinations than when the structure is predefined in terms of a colour and shape
space (i.e., compositional rules such as S → r gbs, S → rg bs etc. are also possible) [60].
Hence, as for the signal space with short signals and limited alphabet size, it is more likely
to find a structure that can be exploited in compositional structures. Once compositional
rules are used successfully, their weights are reinforced and more likely to be reused. As a
compositional rule can be applicable in more situations than individual holistic rules, the
rule weight of the compositional rule soon wins the competition from the rule weights of
individual rules.
Another consequence of the co-evolution of meaning and grammar is that during de-
velopment, the learner’s representation of meanings differs from the adult’s representation,
as illustrated in Fig. 12. The figure shows a—for the illustration perfectly structured—
language of an adult and an intermediate stage of a learner. The adult has 5 categories/
Fig. 12. Differences between an adult’s and learner’s language at a certain stage during the learner’s development.
The adult (left) has acquired an ontology that maps onto the world reliably, but the learner (right) has not yet
acquired all these categories. In the adult’s conceptual space, the categories that overlap with the learner’s central
category EB are highlighted. In the learner’s conceptual space, the adult’s categories are superposed as indicated
by the dotted lines. See the text for further details.
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learner has only acquired 3 categories in the horizontal dimension and 4 in the vertical di-
mension. Suppose that expressions are composed with the vertical dimension first, leading
to expressions such as “aea”, “aefg”, “gha” etc. Furthermore, meanings can be constructed
in a similar way, so the learner can have meanings DA, DB, EA, EB etc.
Around this stage of the development, the learner could have learnt the following rules:
S → Y X ρ1
Y → jkm/[Dw1,Ew2] ρ2 X → fg/[Aw6,Bw7] ρ5
Y → bi/[Ew3] ρ3 X → o/[Bw8] ρ6
Y → c/[Ew4,Fw5] ρ4 X → kha/[Bw9,Cw10] ρ7
It is unlikely that the learner would have learnt all these rules in this way, but when it is
exposed to the adult’s language, it would undoubtedly have acquired some of these rules.
A learner with a limited set of categorical features, as in the early stages of development,
is more likely to discover a semantic structure with respect to a syntactic structure than a
learner who has a fully predefined, ‘innate’ set of categorical features, but no semantic
structure. This effect, though small, is confirmed in [60], where it was shown that the
initial level of compositionality was significantly lower when the categorical features were
predefined. However, the same study also revealed that in the GG with a population of size
6, compositionality remained stable in the absence of a bottleneck. This latter phenomenon
can be explained by the absence of a meaning shift (see below).
In summary, given the learning mechanisms for discovering and constructing compo-
sitional structures, the rapid emergence of compositionality depends to a large extent on
the statistically high distribution of reoccurring structures in both the signal and meaning
spaces. This statistical effect is increased by the ontogenetical development of categori-
cal features. In addition, the selectionist reinforcement of rule weights further boosts the
emergence of compositionality.
5.3. Factors of instability
Given the seeming ease with which compositionality emerges, it is striking to see that
it is not stable in all circumstances. In many cases, holistic communication systems take
over after a while. This is especially surprising, given both the statistical nature of the data
to be learnt and the learning mechanism with an inbuilt bias toward compositionality.8
As the instability most frequently occurs in simulations of the observational game, it
is good to start investigating the instability factors with respect to this game. First it is
important to realise that holistic communication systems have a higher level of accuracy
and coherence in the OG. This indicates that—at least for the OG—a holistic system is
easier to learn.
To see why this is the case, let us briefly return to the example illustrated in Fig. 12
and assume that the learner has acquired all signals, but not yet all categorical features
8 Note that Kirby turns the surprise the other way around: he is surprised that compositionality emerges when
there is a bottleneck, rather than being surprised that no compositionality emerges when there is no bottleneck
[23].
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acquired the same categorical features as the adult. Then the learner could have acquired
three names (“fg”, “o” and “kha”) in relation to the category that the adult names “o” in
the X dimension, which is a refinement of the earlier meaning B of the learner. Likewise,
what the adult calls “bi” relates to the category that the learner could have associated with
“jkm”, “bi” and “c”. Supposing there are 3 adults, the input to a learner is likely to be even
more diverse, because the different agents may have slightly different categorical features
themselves. So, different words could be spread even further through the conceptual space,
shifting the meaning of a word, such as “o” to either side of the X dimension. Such shifts
affect much of the conceptual space, making the language unstable.
In the OG, this is—in a certain way—allowed without affecting the accuracy too much,
because in this game the hearer knows the speaker’s topic. If the hearer has an association
of the topic’s meaning with the speaker’s utterance, whether or not it is the hearer’s pre-
ferred one, the game is considered successful. The weights are increased, while competing
rules are laterally inhibited. But as there are already many associations/rules competing
and different adults may use different utterances, the chances that another rule will take
over are high. Consequently, a lot of unstable fluctuations are present in the competition,
which makes the language hard to learn.
One the other hand, when the language is holistic, words are stored in more limited areas
of the conceptual space. The chance of moving such a word through the conceptual space
is much lower, causing fewer fluctuations, and is therefore easier to learn. When at some
point, a less structured input is presented to a learner, this can have the consequence that
compositional rules are less often successful, causing a decrease in their strength, making
way for more holistic rules to win the competition. Once such a process starts, holistic
rules become stronger and compositional rules weaker and the whole system turns around
within a couple of iterations.
In the guessing games, this effect is less strong and only occurs when there is no bottle-
neck. This is because, in the GG, words are not allowed to move over the meaning space so
easily. If this happens, the chance of failure in the game is high, because the hearers must
guess the speaker’s topic: the more possibilities there are, the more likely a failure. Failures
do not come unnoticed, but are immediately punished by inhibiting such rules. In addition,
when the right choices are made, these rules will be reinforced and competing rules in-
hibited, thus strengthening the disambiguation in the competition. As a consequence, the
compositional rules are learnt properly—especially when there is a bottleneck. When there
is no bottleneck, the holistic rules tend to enter the language more gradually. Though once
a process is started, this can lead to a cascade of failures in compositional rules, which then
make way for holistic rules.
In a way, this explains the difference between the OG and the GG in a similar way as
was previously done in [55,62]. Because the OG has perfect joint attention, there is little
pressure to disambiguate the language; in fact verbal communication becomes redundant
as explained by the signal redundancy paradox [39]. This paradox states that if the agents
have other means than language to establish joint attention, verbal communication becomes
redundant. In the guessing game, there is a pressure to disambiguate ambiguities because
the topic is not given beforehand, but must be guessed from the expression.
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not use a population turnover, might draw the wrong conclusion that once a compositional
structure is learnt, this will persist in the language. This is important, because many studies
base their results on experiments without a population turnover, such as [2,17,46].
5.4. The effect of population size
The first set of experiments in this paper used a population size of 2: 1 adult and 1
learner, which is the same as typically done in experiments using the ILM [6,7,23,24,41,
69]—but see [42]. The results of the current study differs in a large extent from the usual
ILM studies in that the current experiments yielded an emergence of compositionality in
the absence of a bottleneck, whereas this did not occur in the other experiments.
In addition, the current experiments showed that the model is well scalable to a larger
population size, while this has been proved difficult with Kirby’s ILM model [42]. More-
over, when the population size is increased, the characteristics of the other ILM studies
reappear in that holistic languages emerge without a bottleneck and compositional ones
with a bottleneck.
The reason why the experiments with a population size of 2 yielded relatively stable
compositional systems in the absence of a bottleneck—as opposed to the experiments of
population size 6—lies in the fact that a learner only learns from 1 adult. As a consequence,
the probability that words become spread over the meaning space is less likely, and the bias
towards compositional rules generally wins over the advantages of having holistic rules.
However, the results also show that in some occasions, the system does become instable,
which suggests that in those cases, the ambiguity of the compositional system becomes too
large. Whether or not this is actually the case remains to be verified in future experiments.
When the population size is larger, the learning takes place with input from 3 different
individuals. As explained above, this can lead to a meaning drift that makes the compo-
sitional system unstable when there is no bottleneck in the transmission. When there is a
bottleneck, however, the GG yields highly stable compositional systems.
Compositionality in the current experiment emerged readily from the second iteration
onward (at least when it remained stable). Each iteration was run for 6,000 games, which
is equivalent to around 2,000 games for each learner to acquire the language of around 120
objects. Are these many language games really required for a stable communication sys-
tem to emerge? Recent unpublished simulations have revealed that when a total of 2,000
language games (i.e., around 667 games per learner) are played, a stable and successful
compositionality emerges for a guessing game in the presence of a bottleneck. How this
will scale up in terms of population size, number of objects and complexity of the con-
ceptual spaces (i.e., number of quality dimensions) remains to be seen. For vocabulary
systems, a relation has been found between the time of convergence (T ) in communica-
tive success and the number of meanings M and agents N following T ∝ S · N · ln(N)
[21]. Gong et al. [17] have shown—in a similar simulation as the current one, but with a
predefined semantics and without a population turnover—that compositional systems can
emerge with a population of size 50, though many of their parameter settings (e.g., number
of meanings) have not been specified. Preliminary studies on the further scalability of the
guessing game model indicate that compositionality can remain stable in populations of
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In addition, work is in progress to extend the current model in a very large scale simu-
lation (1,000+ agents) on the evolution of language and culture in the recently started New
Ties9 project [63]. In this project many more objects and actions will become part of the
agents’ environment, which they can detect using more quality dimensions with fewer fea-
tures, which—according to Brighton [6] can yield more stable compositional systems than
systems of low dimension and large number of features (which is the case in the current ex-
periment). A selection mechanism will then be required to select which quality dimensions
will be used to form a sentence, rather than constraining sentences to cover all dimensions
as in the current model. This selection criterion could be based on the ecological relevance
and distinctiveness for the agents in a particular context; an aspect that the current model
lacks and which may have a large impact on the development of language.
5.5. The influence of the bottleneck
Imposing a bottleneck on the transmission of language leads to the emergence of com-
positionality in the GG. This confirms the results previously obtained in, e.g., [6,7,23,
24,41,69]. The emergence of compositionality under the influence of a bottleneck can be
explained by noticing that the adults teach the learners about certain previously unseen ob-
jects. The use of compositional structures aids in doing so, as explained by the following
example. Suppose an agent has acquired the rules
S/rgbs → A/rgb B/s
A/rgb → blue/[0r ,0g,1b] B/s → square/[1s ]
A/rgb → red/[1r ,0g,0b] B/s → triangle/[0s ]
from observing a blue square, a blue triangle and a red triangle. This agent is able to
communicate not only about these objects, but also about previously unseen red squares.
As a result of using compositional rules successfully, these will be reinforced and hence
be reselected and so on. The next generation will then observe more structure, allowing to
preserve and build up even more structure.
Clearly the GG shows a high and stable level of compositionality under the presence of
a bottleneck. The OG, however, does not reveal this when the population is larger than 2,
although compositionality tends to remain longer in the population. Apparently, the lack
of pressure for disambiguation in the OG (see above) is stronger than the pressure imposed
by the bottleneck.
The size of the bottleneck does matter. It has been shown by Brighton that—under
certain conditions—the stronger the bottleneck is, the higher the chance for stable compo-
sitional languages [6]. This result is confirmed by the GG, where for bottlenecks stronger
than or equal to 25%, compositionality is very stable at more or less similar levels. When
9 New Ties stands for: New Emerging World models through Individual, Evolutionary and Social learning. See
http://www.new-ties.org.
P. Vogt / Artificial Intelligence 167 (2005) 206–242 239the bottleneck is weaker, the stability is less secure (see the large standard deviations in
Fig. 11), meaning that compositionality is sometimes stable, sometimes not.
In the current experiments, a bottleneck on the transmission of language is imposed by
the experimenter. It has been shown, however, that when learners are allowed to act as
speakers during their development, compositionality can emerge in the GG with a popula-
tion size of 6 in the absence of the imposed transmission bottleneck [61]. (A more recent
unpublished study indicates that this finding is even stronger when the population size
is increased to 100 agents.) This is understood when realising that when learners start to
speak, they are faced with a bottleneck, because due to their developmental stage, they may
encounter previously unseen (or unheard) objects. If, however, they have learnt parts of the
objects’ meanings, they can exploit these by producing a compositional expression. This is
interesting, as it may help to explain why children are so good at developing grammar, such
as observed in normal situations [29], or perhaps at inventing grammar as in Nicaraguan
Sign Language [36] and possibly creoles [35].
6. Conclusion
The model presented in this paper provides a promising framework for studying the
emergence and evolution of compositional structures in language by exploiting both reg-
ularities found in the real world and (randomly generated) regularities found in linguistic
surface structures. As both human languages and the world are highly structured, the model
could be used profitable in the development of robotic platforms too.
From a scientific point of view, the experiments show that, in the model, compositional
structures can emerge such that they reflect the structures of the world to a large extent.
Factors influencing the emergence of compositionality include induction mechanisms,
structures of the world, (randomly generated) structures in expressions and transmission
bottlenecks. The latter confirms findings by [6,23,41,69] and can be used to argue that “the
poverty of the stimulus solves the poverty of the stimulus” [69]. Moreover, the parallel
development of syntax and semantics also appears to have a positive effect on the develop-
ment of compositionality. The results also confirm earlier findings that the guessing game
appears to provide a better strategy to evolve qualitatively more informative languages than
the observational games do [55,62].
Current research focuses on scaling the experiments in terms of population sizes [63],
and other parameters affecting the current model, such as the alphabet size. Future work
will then scale the complexity of both the world and the agents in order to provide an
environment for more complex languages to emerge. In addition, work is underway in
order to extend the results of [61] regarding the potential ability to explain the grammatical
creativity found in children.
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